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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this 
appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment and denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration 
where the only reasoning provided for setting aside the default was the 
Court's sua sponte assertion that Appellee was not properly served with the 
Notice to Appear of Appoint, but where Appellee was served with a Notice to 
Appear or Appoint pursuant to Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
1. Standard of Review: A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set 
aside a default judgment. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75,H 9, 11 P.3d 277. Though 
broad, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited. Id. As a threshold matter, a 
court's ruling must be "based on adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." Id. 
(citing May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). A 
decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. Id. 
Moreover, the nature of a default judgment and the equitable nature of 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide further limits. Id. at J^10. For 
example, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a trial court's "discretion should 
be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in 
a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Id. (citing Helgesen 
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v Inyangumia. * ;'- ] cuisr ' ^~-w ue 
Court has further stated that "if default is issued when a party genuinely is 
mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, 
the equity side of the con n t [si i : i lid] gi ant i elk f ' (cith t..g May, 6 7 7 P 2d at 
11 rinciples, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "'it is 
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failwc in appeal, ttiid iiiiicl) appliraliim is mudc In \n nil iisnlc *" Id ill i||ll i 
Helgesen, 636P.2dat 1081). 
2. Issue Preserved at: [R. 374; 0 16 (Transcript for Hearing on February 27, 2006, 
attached hereto as Addendum " 1 " ™ c M::..^n:.ioi;ni u 
. Suppoilnl \ iinidi'il l\ 1 if»111 mi lin '".-. - «.l. ' : :* r a \iklerduni 
"T\ pg. i 5J. [R. 275 (Ruling dated March 31, 2006 denying Motion for 
Reconsideration, attached hereto as Addendum "3"]. 
SI A I EMEN1 OF ' 1 HE CASE 
1- Nature of the Case 1 lie underlying facts of this case involve Appellant Kenneth 
Davis' ("Davis") claims to real proper!} located in American Fork, I Jtah County. 
Appellee Dennis Goldsworthy ("GoldsworuI\ > i.s she present title owner ( ,;.., 
hereinafter, all citations to the trial transcript shall be designated [R. : ] indicating 
page number and line number separated by a colon. 
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property, having received title to the property through Davis' ex-wife, Edna Davis, 
who is now deceased. In his complaint, Davis asserts a right to the property 
through an agreement with his ex-wife and that the transfers to Goldsworthy were 
in contravention to the agreement and were the result of undue influence and/or 
fraud. [R. 012]. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Davis filed the present action on 
December 23, 2003. [R: 006]. In June 2005, Goldsworthy failed to appear at a 
regularly and properly scheduled deposition, and as a result Davis filed a Motion 
to Compel Goldsworthy's attendance. [R: 066, 089]. Just prior to the hearing 
scheduled on the Motion, Goldsworthy's counsel requested to withdraw from the 
case. [R. 108-124]. 
Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Davis' counsel 
mailed a Notice to Appear or Appoint to Goldsworthy via first class mail on 
September 7, 2005. This Notice was sent to Goldsworthy's last known addresses. 
[R. 130]. As a result of Goldsworthy's failure to appear on October 14, 2005 at the 
rescheduled hearing on Davis' Motion to Compel and his failure to attend the 
properly noticed deposition, the trial court struck Goldsworthy's pleadings and 
entered default against him. [R. 134]. An order striking Goldsworthy's pleadings 
was entered by the trial court on November 7, 2005. [R.134]. 
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Based on Davis' Request for a Hearing on Damages and Equitable Relief 
the Court set a hearing for February 3, 2006. [R. 136]. Notice of this hearing was 
sent out by the Court on December 22, 2005. [R. 139]. On January 27, 2006, 
Gregory Hansen filed an appearance of counsel on Goldsworthy's behalf and filed 
a Motion to Continue the Damages Hearing. [R. 148, 150]. On February 2, 2006, 
Goldsworthy filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156]. 
At the hearing on February 3, 2006, the trial court granted a continuance of 
the hearing on damages until the Motion to Set Aside Default could be heard on 
February 27, 2006. [R. 186]. At the hearing on the motion to set aside on February 
27, 2006, the trial court granted the Motion to Set Aside Default based an issue not 
raised or briefed by Goldsworthy but raised by the Court sua sponte. [R. 222]. On 
March 3, 2006, responding to the Court's sua sponte reasoning for granting the 
Motion to Set Aside Default, Davis filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Court's decision setting forth controlling case law setting forth that improper 
service of a notice to appear appoint is not grounds for setting aside default. [R. 
232 - 237]. The Motion was denied on March 31, 2006. [R. 275]. Goldsworthy 
later filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by the Court on August 7, 
2006, and an order entered on September 8, 2006 [R. 364, 370]. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed on October 5, 2006 [R. 373]. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts of this case concern the procedural history culminating in the 
trial court's decision to set aside the default judgment entered against Goldsworthy. In 
particular, on December 23, 2003, Davis filed a complaint and amended complaint 
against Goldsworthy wherein Davis claimed ownership of real property located in 
American Fork, Utah County. [R. 012:2]. Goldsworthy is the present owner of the 
property, and received title to the property through Davis' ex-wife, Edna Davis, who is 
now deceased. [R. 012:2-3]. In his complaint, Davis alleged claim to the property through 
an agreement with his ex-wife and that the transfers to Goldsworthy were in 
contravention to the agreement, and were the result of undue influence and/or fraud. [R. 
012: 4-6]. 
On May 5, 2005, Davis noticed up Goldsworthy's deposition, to be held on 
Monday, June 13, 2005. [R. 066:1]. Goldsworthy's counsel arranged to appear at the 
deposition via telephone. However, at the appointed time of the deposition, Goldsworthy 
failed to appear. [R. 166: 2]. On the record, Goldsworthy's counsel confirmed that he had 
made several attempts to locate Goldsworthy but had been unable to do so. [R. 166: 3]. 
Accordingly, Davis filed a Motion to Compel Goldsworthy's Attendance at Deposition. 
[R. 095]. The Court set a hearing on Davis' Motion for September 2, 2005 [R. 105], but 
prior to the hearing Goldsworthy's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. [R. 
108]. 
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The basis for the Motion to Withdraw was that the Goldsworthy had failed to pay 
for the attorney services, failed to contact his counsel, and had moved out of the area to 
an unknown address. [R. 108: 1-2; 111: 1-2]. Neither of the mailing certificates 
accompanying the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel or the Declaration of James W. Jensen 
included Goldsworthy's last known addresses. [R. 108: 3; 111: 3]. Indeed, only the 
Notice of Entry of Order Permitting Withdrawal of Counsel contained an address for 
Goldsworthy, which was his business address. [R. 127: 3]. 
Because the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel did not include the last known 
address of the Goldsworthy, upon entry of the Order permitting Goldsworthy's counsel to 
withdraw, Davis' counsel obtained Goldsworthy's last known addresses from his former 
counsel. [R. 375: 11 - 12]. Thereafter, pursuant to Rules 5(b)(1) and 74 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Davis' counsel served a Notice to Appear or Appoint to both 
Goldsworthy's home and business addresses. [R. 130:3]. At the continued hearing on 
October 14, 2005 on Davis' Motion to Compel, as a result of Goldsworthy's failure to 
appear, the Court struck Goldsworthy's pleadings and counterclaim and default judgment 
was granted against him. [R. 131; 134:1]. Davis' counsel prepared an order reflecting the 
Court's ruling, a copy of which was mailed to Goldsworthy on October 19, 2005 to both 
addresses. [R. 134:3]. 
Because Davis' complaint did not contain a request for damages in a sum certain 
amount, Davis requested a hearing on damages [R.136], and on December 22, 2005 the 
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Court set a hearing on the issue of damages for February 3, 2006 [R. 139]. The request for 
hearing on damages was sent to both of Goldsworthy's addresses [136: 2], and the Court 
sent notice of the hearing to Goldsworthy's business and home addresses. [R. 139: 2]. 
The Notice sent to Goldsworthy's business was returned to the Court as undeliverable. 
[R. 142]. 
On January 20, 2006, the Court received a letter dated January 16, 2006 from 
Goldsworthy indicating that he had received notice "from my ex-wife stating there is to 
be a hearing on February 3, 2006." [R. 146 (Letter to Court attached hereto as Addendum 
"4")]. Goldsworthy claimed to not have been aware of the proceedings in the case "due 
to the fact that I no longer live in Utah and now live in Colorado." [R. 146]. Goldsworthy 
further requested a continuance of the hearing so that he could get time off work and to 
acquire new counsel. [R. 146]. Immediately prior to the damages hearing, Gregory 
Hansen filed an appearance of counsel on Goldsworthy's behalf and simultaneously filed 
a Motion to Continue the Damages Hearing. [R. 148, 150]. The day before the damages 
hearing, Goldsworthy filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156]. 
The next day, the Court granted a continuance until February 27, 2006 to give the parties 
time to brief Goldsworthy's Motion to Set Aside Default. [R. 186]. 
In his Motion to Set Aside Default, Goldsworthy argued that the default judgment 
should be set aside due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect due to the fact that: 
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Defendant was going through a divorce at the time the litigation began, and was 
required to shut down his business, and move to Colorado. His only stable address 
was that of his business. When he moved, he had no forwarding address. He had 
not been able to communicate with his former counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of 
2005, and moved the first week of June, 2005, which was when the Subpoena 
Duces Tecum was served on his counsel. Defendant's counsel did not inform him 
of the Subpoena or the deposition, and then withdrew in September of 2005 
without informing him of the status of the case. [R. 156: 2 (Goldsworthy's Motion 
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default, attached hereto as 
Addendum "5", pg. 2)]. 
Goldsworthy further argued that these events were "so distracting and consuming that he 
neglected to pay attention to the lawsuit." [R. 156:2]. Furthermore, Goldsworthy asserted 
simply that the Motion to Set Aside should be granted because "Defendant states that the 
claims made by the Plaintiff in the case are false." [R. 156:2]. 
In his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside, Davis argued that 
pursuant to Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, p , 104 P.3d 664, Goldsworthy had 
failed to show either excusable neglect or that he had a meritorious defense to the action. 
[R. 195:2]. Davis argued that Goldsworthy's unsupported statement that Davis' claims 
were "false" fell well below the requirement that Davis must "present a clear and specific 
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the 
claimant." Hernandez at ^6. [R. 195: 2]. Davis further argued that pursuant to Black's 
Title Inc. v. Utah State Ins. DepU 1999 UT App 330, f 10, 991 P. 2d 607, Goldsworthy 
had failed to show that he had "used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Id. [R. 195: 2 - 5]. 
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On the day prior to the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Goldsworthy 
submitted a lengthy Reply Memorandum wherein he argued at length that Davis' claims 
had no merit because Davis had no standing to raise his claims and that there were 
meritorious factual disputes to Davis' claims. [R. 217]. At the hearing the following day, 
Goldsworthy presented arguments raised in both his initial Memorandum as well as his 
Reply Memorandum, despite the Court's indication that it had not received the Reply 
Memorandum and over Davis' objection. [R. 374: 3 -9] . 
During Davis' counsel's argument, the Court interjected to inquire as to the 
method used to serve Goldsworthy with the Notice to Appear of Appoint. [R. 375: 11]. 
Davis' counsel explained Goldsworthy's addresses were obtained from his prior counsel, 
and that the Notice to Appear or Appoint was served via regular first class mail to both 
Goldsworthy's last known home and business addresses. [R. 375: 11 - 12]. Davis' 
counsel argued that it was Goldsworthy's responsibility to maintain a forwarding address 
with the Court and that the rules do not require service via return receipt or personal 
service. [R. 375: 12 - 15]. Because the issue was raised sua sponte by the Court and had 
not been argued by Goldsworthy, Davis' counsel indicated that he was willing to submit a 
legal memorandum on the issue. [R. 375:12]. The Court, however, ruled to set aside the 
default judgment, stating simply, "I'm going to grant their motion to set aside the default 
judgment" [R. 375:16] without making any further findings. Indeed, as part of its basis 
Page 9 of 21 
for awarding attorney fees the Court informed Goldsworthy that he had "been less than 
diligent in maintaining contact with your attorneys and this court" [R. 375:16]. 
Just two days after the hearing, Davis requested that the Court review its 
decision to set aside default. [R. 224]. In his Memorandum in Support of Amended 
Motion for Reconsideration, Davis argued that pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Goldsworthy's prior counsel was required to include the Goldsworthy's 
address as part of the motion to withdraw, and that subsection (b) of that Rule provides 
simply that Davis should "serve" the notice on the unrepresented party. [R. 237: 3]. Rule 
5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that unless otherwise specified in 
the Rules, service of documents filed with the Court "shall be made by delivering a copy 
or by mailing a copy to the last known address, or if no address is known, by leaving it 
with the clerk of the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(l)(emphasis added). [R. 237: 3]. 
Furthermore, Davis relied on the memorandum decision of Hawley v. Union Pacific 
Railroad, 2005 UT App 368 (attached hereto as Addendum "6"), to argue that 
Goldsworthy was not entitled to relief from the default judgment because he failed to 
fulfill his duty to inform the trial court of changes in his address. [R. 237: 4]. 
Despite the factual similarities between the actions taken by Goldsworthy and 
those taken by the Defendant in Hawley, the trial Court denied Davis' Motion for 
Reconsideration and ruled that the Motion did "not present arguments that could not have 
been made in connection with the motion." [R. 275]. Davis now seeks this Court's 
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review of the trial court's ruling to set aside default judgment based upon the arguments 
set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against 
Goldsworthy because Davis adequately served Goldsworthy with a notice to appear or 
appoint and because Goldsworthy otherwise failed to show that excusable neglect 
justified setting aside the default entered against him. Accordingly, Davis seeks an order 
from this Court reversing the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment against 
Goldsworthy, and remanding the action for a determination of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside default judgment because 
Goldsworthy was properly served with a notice to appear or appoint, the decision was not 
based on adequate findings or on the law, and Goldsworthy otherwise failed to show 
excusable neglect. In the preceding below, the trial court granted Goldsworthy's Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment and denied Davis' Motion for Reconsideration based upon 
the reasoning that Goldsworthy did not have proper notice to appear or appoint because it 
was known at the time of the withdrawal of Goldsworthy's prior counsel that the 
addresses on record for Goldsworthy were not current. The Court further denied Davis' 
Motion for Reconsideration on the basis that the arguments raised in the motion could 
have been made in connection with the motion to set aside default. 
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In order to obtain relief from a default judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of excusable neglect, a defendant must show: (i) 
that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect; (ii) that his motion 
to set aside the judgment was timely, and (iii) that he has a meritorious defense to the 
action. Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, p , 104 P.3d 664. The basis of this 
appeal is that as a matter of law, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
Goldsworthy's motion to set aside default judgment. 
A. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Setting Aside Default Judgment 
Based on the Decision that Service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was not 
Adequate, 
As a threshold matter, the trial court erred in ruling that default judgment should 
be set aside because Goldsworthy was not served a Notice to Appear of Appoint via 
registered mail or personal service. Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for the withdrawal of counsel and the sending of a Notice to Appear or Appoint. 
In particular Rule 74(a) states in relevant part that the notice of withdrawal shall include 
"the address of the attorney's client" and subsection (b) of the same rule provides that 
"the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the 
unrepresented party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Of note, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that 
service upon a party of documents filed with the Court, unless otherwise specified by the 
Rules, "shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known 
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address, or if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 5(b)(l)(emphasis added). 
A plain reading of Rule 74 in conjunction with Rule 5(b)(1) does not require either 
personal service or service via registered mail of a Notice to Appear or Appoint. 
Furthermore, the case of Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad, 2005 UT App 368, directly 
addresses the issue of whether the method of service of the notice to appear or appoint a 
sufficient is basis for setting aside default judgment. In Hawley, the Plaintiff sought 
relief from Summary Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on the 
alternative arguments that he had failed to receive a notice to appear or appoint counsel, 
and that he was never served with notice of the judgment. In affirming the trial court's 
decision to deny Mr. Hawley's motion for relief from the judgment, the Court held that: 
Hawley is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because he did not fulfill his 
duty to inform the trial court and opposing counsel of any changes in his 
address nor did he exercise due diligence in keeping himself informed of 
ongoing court proceedings. See Volostnykh v. Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per 
curiam)(recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of any address 
changes and to "keep themselves apprised of ongoing court proceedings"). 
Here, Hawley did not inform the trial court or opposing counsel of his new 
address. Union Pacific received Mueller's notice of withdrawal but the new 
address was not listed in the notice, rather it was found in the mailing 
certificate. As a result, Union Pacific attempted to mail Hawley a notice to 
appear or appoint counsel to the address provided in the Complaint twice, but 
both attempts were unsuccessful. Id. 
The facts of this case are directly analogous to those in Hawley. In both instances, 
neither Hawley nor Goldsworthy made any attempt to inform the Court or opposing 
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counsel of a new address. [R. 165:2]. In the present case, Goldsworthy did not even make 
an attempt to keep his counsel informed as to his address. [R. 108: 1-2; 111: 1-2]. 
Furthermore, Goldsworthy's own letter requesting a continuance of the damages 
hearing reveals that he had received notice of the hearing through his ex-wife. [R. 146]. 
Presumably the second address listed in mailing certificate for the Notice of Hearing is 
the address of Goldsworthy's ex-wife and because this notice was not returned to the 
Court as undeliverable. [R. 142]. Of note, a copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint, 
Default Judgment, and the Request for a Hearing on Damages were also sent to this 
address. [R. 130:3; 134:3; 136:2]. 
As in Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel received a defective notice of withdrawal which 
did not correctly identify the last known address of the Defendant. Nevertheless, as 
Union Pacific did in Hawley, Davis' counsel attempted to mail Goldsworthy a notice to 
appear or appoint counsel to the address where Goldsworthy was served as well as his 
business address. Nothing in Hawley, or in Rule 74, suggests that Plaintiffs counsel had 
a duty above and beyond serving Goldsworthy with a notice to appear or appoint by 
regular first class mail to his last known address. Indeed, Hawley specifically states that 
it was Goldsworthy's duty to keep himself current with ongoing proceedings and to 
update his address with the Court. Furthermore, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that in 
the event that there is no last know address for a party, that service is complete upon 
delivery of the document with the clerk of the court. Thus, even in the event that service 
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of the Notice to Appear or Appoint had been returned as undeliverable to both of 
Goldworthy's addresses, service would be complete under Rule 5 by delivery of the 
Notice to the clerk of the court. 
While these arguments were raised in Davis' Motion for Reconsideration, the trial 
court denied the motion on the basis that Davis "did not present arguments that could not 
have been made in connection with the motion." However, as noted above, the issue of 
proper service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was first raised by the Court at the 
hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. When asked regarding the service 
requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint, Davis' counsel noted that the issue had not 
been raised by Goldsworthy in his memoranda in support of his motion and suggested that 
he would, and could, provide a legal brief outlining the authorities that supported Davis' 
position that the method of service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint chosen by Davis 
was sufficient. While not citing any case law, Plaintiffs counsel further argued that the 
requirement that Plaintiff was required to personally serve the Notice to Appear or 
Appoint was onerous and not required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, 
while Davis' counsel did raise the essential arguments set forth in Hawley during oral 
argument on the motion to set aside, because the issue was raised sua sponte, Davis' 
counsel could not reasonably have been expected to cite the Hawley opinion during the 
course of argument. Thus, it was appropriate for Davis to bring this controlling authority 
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to the Court's attention through a motion for reconsideration, and given the ruling in 
Hawley the trial court should have granted Davis' Motion for Reconsideration. 
B. Default Judgment should not have been Set Aside because it was not 
Supported by Any Findings of Fact or on the Law because Goldsworthy 
Failed to Show Excusable Neglect to Set Aside the Default Judgment. 
Next, this Court should revers the trial court's ruling because the evidence 
presented by Goldsworthy does not provide a reasonable basis for the Court's decision to 
set aside the default judgment against Goldsworthy. In order to have the default set aside 
on the grounds of excusable neglect, Goldsworthy "must show that he has used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had 
no control. Black's Title Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept, 1999 UT App 330,1J10 991 P.2d 
607. The Utah Supreme Court has found that simply alleging illness alone is not 
sufficient to show excusable neglect, but the Defendant must also allege that the illness 
incapacitated the Defendant so that he was unable to act. Id. (citing Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 74, 743 (Utah 1953)). 
Furthermore, in the matter of Sierra Wholesale Supply, L.L.C. v. Radiant 
Technologies, Inc. 2005 UT App 540 (Attached hereto as Addendum "7"), this Court 
stated: 
Although Defendant avers that its president was out of the office recovering 
from back surgery, no affidavit was submitted to the trial court detailing how 
this so incapacitated Defendant, a corporation doing business on a national 
scale, that it was unable to take steps to protect its rights. See Warren v. Dixon 
Ranch Co.,123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)] (finding that excusable 
Page 16 of 21 
neglect was not demonstrated by an affidavit that did not "identify the nature 
of the illness" or demonstrate how the director and trustee of the defendant 
corporation "was so incapacitated that he could not have called an attorney to 
have his right and the rights of the corporation protected"). We agree with the 
trial court's observation that it seems unlikely that the president of such a 
corporation would be "out of the office for back surgery and no one is looking 
at this mail." Even if this were the case, however, it does not demonstrate that 
Defendant acted with the "due diligence" necessary to show excusable neglect. 
See Black's Title, 1999 Ut App 330 at ^ 10 (quotations and citation omitted). 
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside the default 
judgment on these grounds. Id. 
In this case, the reasons provided by Goldsworthy to evidence that he used due 
diligence were that: 
(1) Defendant was going through a divorce at the time the litigation began, and 
was required to shut down his business, and move to Colorado. (2) His only 
stable address was that of his business. (3) When he moved, he had no 
forwarding address. (4) He had not been able to communicate with his former 
counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of 2005, and moved the first week of June, 
2005, which was when the Subpoena Duces Tecum was served on his counsel. 
(5) Defendant's counsel did not inform him of the Subpoena or the deposition, 
and then withdrew in September of 2005 without informing him of the status 
of the case. [R. 156: 2 (Goldsworthy's Motion and Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Set Aside Default, attached hereto as Addendum "5", pg. 2)]. See 
also [R. 219: 2-3](internal numbers added for clarification purposes). 
Furthermore, Goldsworthy's affidavit indicates that (6) "the divorce, move, and 
closing of my business consumed my attention, and I neglected the lawsuit because of it" 
and that (7) because of these events he was "unable to properly attend to this lawsuit." [R. 
210:2]. 
The trial court did not cite any findings of facts in making its determination to set 
aside default judgment. While the Court has broad discretion in granting a motion to set 
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aside default judgment, as a threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on adequate 
findings of fact" and "on the law." May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984). 
Indeed, the only statement that may be construed as a finding by the Court does not 
support the setting aside of the default judgment. In granting an award of attorney's fees 
the Court informed Goldsworthy that he "had been less than diligent in maintaining 
contact with your attorneys and this court." [R. 375:16]. The facts presented by 
Goldsworthy in his own defense fail on their face to show excusable neglect because he 
failed to allege how his divorce, move, or closing of his business so incapacitated him so 
that he was unable to act 
In particular, Goldsworthy has made no allegations that the divorce, move, and 
close of his business were events so "outside his control" that he could not have 
maintained contact with his attorney or retained new counsel in order to protect his rights. 
In some ways, the present case is more egregious than the neglect evidenced in Sierra and 
Black's Title. Specifically, in the present case Goldsworthy actually retained an attorney 
to prosecute the matter, who filed a counterclaim on his behalf, [R. 44], and was involved 
in setting the time and date for the deposition scheduled for June 13, 2005. [R. 172:2]. 
All that was required was that Goldsworthy keep in contact with his attorney and respond 
to requests through his attorney. But by Goldsworthy own admission, he "neglected" the 
lawsuit. [R. 210:2]. In other words, Goldsworthy had ample opportunity to respond, 
obtain counsel, appear at properly noticed depositions and other hearings, and simply 
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chose not to respond, become involved, protect his rights, or even communicate with his 
attorney. 
Contrary to Goldsworthy's affidavit testimony that he had no contact with his 
attorney since May 2005, at the time of the deposition, Goldsworthy's attorney indicated 
that he had "initiated a telephone call and talked to [Goldsworthy's] employment who 
said that he was obligated to go to Colorado and didn't give me the details as to why." [R. 
166:3]. Furthermore, Goldsworthy's affidavit states simply that "he has not been able to 
communicate with his former counsel since May 2005," but provides no further 
information regarding whether this failure to communicate was a result of his own neglect 
or that of his attorney. [R. 44]. Goldsworthy's prior attorney's affidavit evidences that 
Goldsworthy failed to contact his attorney and not the other way around. [R. 108: 1-2; 
111; 1-2]. Any inability to obtain information regarding the status of the case and the 
eventual withdrawal of prior counsel was not a result of Goldsworthy's prior counsel's 
actions, but as a direct result of Goldsworthy's neglect. 
As indicated in Hawley, it was Goldsworthy's responsibility to keep himself 
apprised of the status of the litigation and to update the Court of his address change. All 
that was required was that Goldsworthy update either his counsel or the Court as to his 
forwarding address. He failed to do either. This failure is particularly acute given that a 
defense was tendered, including a counterclaim, on Goldsworthy's behalf and with his 
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assistance. To suddenly ignore the litigation evidences lack of due diligence higher than 
a simple "loss of interest." 
Goldsworthy failed to use due diligence and was not otherwise prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. Nothing asserted was beyond 
Goldworthy's control and hence the facts and circumstances of this case do not justify 
setting aside default as a result of Goldsworthy's "excusable neglect". Accordingly, the 
Court must reverse the trial court's arbitrary and capricious decision setting aside default 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling setting 
aside default judgment, enter default against Goldsworthy, and remand the matter to the 
trial court for a hearing on damages. 
Respectfully submitted this (W day of April, 2007. 
, ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
LO^LmNAEGLE, ^ 
F o r n e y for Appellant Kenneth Davis 
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ADDENDA 
L Transcript for Hearing on Motion to Set Aside dated February 27, 2006. 
2. Davis' Memorandum in Support of Amended Motion for Reconsideration. 
3. Ruling dated March 31, 2006 denying Davis' Motion for Reconsideration. 
4. Letter to Court from Dennis Goldsworthy date January 16, 2006. 
5. Goldsworthy's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default. 
6. Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad, 2005 UT App 368. 
7. Sierra Wholesale Supply, L.L.C. v. Radiant Technologies, Inc. 2005 UT App 
540. 
Page 21 of 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the |Qr*day of April, 2007 I caused to be delivered via the following 
two copies of the foregoing to the following: 
Gregory Hansen 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY PC 
947 S. 500 E. STE 200 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
# U.S. Mail 
D Facsimile 
• Hand-Delivered 





IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 







KENNETH DAVIS, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs. ) 





















JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on February 27, 2006. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 




3 FOR PLAINTIFF: 
4 JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN, ESQ. 
LORELEI NAEGLE, ESQ. 
5 ASCIONE HEIDEMAN & MCKAY 
2696 N UNIVERSITY AVE #180 
6 PROVO UT 8 4 604 
7 FOR DEFENSE: 
8 GREGORY G. HANSEN, ESQ. 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY 
9 47 S 500 E, #200 
AMERICAN FORK UT 8 4 003 
10 
11 ================================================= 





15 ARGUMENT BY MR. HANSEN 4 
ARGUMENT BY MR. HEIDEMAN 9 












2 (February 27, 2006) 
3 THE JUDGE: Be seated. 
4 Mr. Hansen, you've put us at a substantial 
5 inconvenience. 
6 MR. HANSEN: I know. I apologize for that, 
7 Judge. I'm sorry about that. 
8 THE JUDGE: Am I correct that your client has come 
9 from Colorado for this hearing? 
10 MR. HANSEN: That's true. It was in my notes, it 
11 wasn't on my calendar. No excuse. 
12 THE JUDGE: We set it at 11:00 and we now have 15 
13 minutes. I don't know if that's realistically time to give 
14 a fair exposition of what's before me. And I, I just don't 
15 know quite what to do about that. 
16 Mr. Heideman, it's your motion. No, it's Mr., it's 
17 your motion. Mr. Hansen, it's your motion to set aside the 
18 default judgment. 
19 MR. HANSEN: My motion to set aside. 
20 THE JUDGE: What, literally I have to, I have to 
21 recess in 15 minutes. 
22 MR. HANSEN: Do you have a copy of the reply that 
23 I filed on Friday? 
24 THE JUDGE: No. 
25 MR. HANSEN: That contains a lot of what the court 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 needs to look at. I can give a brief summary if the cfourt 
2 would like. Basically it's the same as what we raised 
3 before. The a,--
4 THE JUDGE: Well let me, let me be accurate. 
5 What I have is there's a fax in the file. We're not able to 
6 receive faxes so I haven't, haven't looked at it. 
7 MR. HANSEN: I filed this on Friday at about 3:00 
8 o'clock. 
9 THE JUDGE: There would be no way. 
10 MR. HANSEN: Okay. 
11 THE JUDGE: I haven't had time to look at them 
12 ARGUMENT BY MR. HANSEN 
13 MR. HANSEN: Basically it is under Rule 60(b) 
14 because of mistake (short inaudible, no mic) or surprise or 
15 neglect excusable neglect. 
16 What happened in this case there is a case that is 
17 very much like it. If you'd like to take it under 
18 advisement and look at this later I would appreciate it. 
19 There is a case Interstate Excavating versis (inaudible word, 
20 no mic), it's a Utah case where a, the situation is very 
21 similar under Rule 60(b). In that case the attorney for the 
22 defendant had not notified him of the pending situation in 
23 the case, nor did the defendant understood what was going on, 
24 then he actively sought to set aside the judgment. 
25 That is basically what has happened in this case. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 The defendant, Goldsworthyfs attorney withdrew. He moved, he 
2 did not have a forwarding address, there was a breach, a 
3 lack of communication there and— 
4 THE JUDGE: Well, I recall the motion to 
5 withdraw. The motion to withdraw was because the attorney 
6 alleged that Mr. Goldsworthy was not communicating with him 
7 so he--
8 MR. HANSEN: That may b e — 
9 THE JUDGE: -- he alleged that he lost, lost 
10 touch with his attorney at that, or with his client at that 
11 point--
12 MR. HANSEN: And that's — 
13 THE JUDGE: — that's why the motion was 
14 granted. 
15 MR. HANSEN: That's correct. And what happened 
16 is that basically he was forced to shut down his business 
17 here, move to Colorado. And he was in the midst of a 
18 divorce. Mr. Goldsworthy's affidavit states that he was 
19 consumed by the divorce. Unlike I think what the plaintiff's 
20 have alleged that a divorce would make you more aware of your 
21 surroundings or more aware of your litigation, anyone who has 
22 been in a divorce or has witnessed the effects it has on a 
23 divorce, a divorce has a person would know that that is 
24 pretty consuming to lose your family, to lose your wife, to 
25 lose your kids. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2 MR. HANSEN: And a, it was just an excusable 
3 neglect. That's, that's basically he just did not take care 
4 of his matters and let the matter go and didn't communicate 
5 with his counsel. His counsel did not forward the 
6 information along to him about the withdrawal, about the 
7 notice to a, to appoint or a, appear. And he only got 
8 notice of the judgment, I'm not exactly sure how he got 
9 notice of the default. But now is actively pursuing to set 
10 aside the default on the merits. 
11 Now the merits are very important here— 
12 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
13 MR. HANSEN: — is because he has a meritorious 
14 defense for his claims. There was a second thing that has 
15 been raised a, by the plaintiff is that we don't have a 
16 meritorious defense. Well, if that's true plaintiff has no 
17 standing to bring a majority of his claims in this case. 
18 Number one--
19 THE JUDGE: Huh-uh (negative). 
20 MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, I'm going to object. 
21 This is not party of the motion. 
22 MR. HANSEN: This is part of my reply. And I'm 
23 sorry you didn't have a chance to take a look at it. 
24 MR. HEIDEMAN: Well, I'm sorry. But it should 
25 have been raised at the time of the motion. The only, the 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 only matters that are appropriate subject matter to be raised 
2 in the reply are matters that are raised in the motion. If 
3 he failed to raise his proffer at the time of the motion 
4 that's not our problem. 
5 MR. HANSEN: The reason I did not, Your Honor, is 
6 because I was contacted pretty late in the game. And there 
7 was some, there was a hearing coming up and I had to get 
8 something on file. Did not have time to adequately research 
9 this until later until I got their reply. So then I 
10 replied. And now it's before the court. I would appreciate 
11 it if the court would take a look at it because it is a 
12 meritorious defense. One of the things that a, the court 
13 must consider are whether there are defenses, whether the 
14 judgment should be set aside or not. 
15 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
16 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor has stated before that a, 
17 that there, it is more likely or it is the tendency to go on 
18 merits rather than just have a, have a default. 
19 The standing issue briefly. The chain of title 
20 shows that the plaintiff had the land with his wife Edna. 
21 Upon their divorce they did not want to have it involved in 
22 the divorce so they transferred it to his parents. His 
23 parents later transferred it back to Edna. Edna was the 
24 sole owner of the property, nothing was ever raised about 
25 that. Then she transferred the property to the defendant. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 The plaintiff has no standing to bring a cause of 
2 action because hefs not an heir of Edna, he hasn't shown that 
3 he is an heir, he's not, he doesn't stand to get it under an 
4 intestate statute nor under a Will. It would be like me 
5 selling my property to you and having the plaintiff come and 
6 say you can't do that. He just doesn't have any standing in 
7 the property, in the zeal property. 
8 Second of all, the divorce decree specifically 
9 states between he and Edna that the only property, everything 
10 that is in their possession at the time of the divorce is 
11 theirs except for a GMC van which I believe is the truck 
12 they're talking about, and his tools. Those are the only 
13 things he's raised in this, in this, in this lawsuit that are 
14 claims for his property. The GMC van is still there at the 
15 property, it's just b€>en moved around behind. Okay. The 
16 tools, we don't know where those are, are about. So that's 
17 really the only issue are there any tools there, who took 
18 them and who is responsible. If they're still there he can 
19 have them, he can go and get his car. In fact, the plaintiff 
20 has stated or the defemdant has stated that Edna has asked 
21 him several times to remove his property from the place. 
22 So all of the furnishings, the household stuff and everything 
23 in the divorce decree is awarded to Edna, she can do whatever 
24 she wants with it after that. He doesn't have any standing 
25 to bring claims against that stuff. The only issue really 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 is the van and the tools. So that's the meritorious 
2 defense. 
3 THE JUDGE: What's the connection of your client 
4 to a, Second Chance, 450 South Main Street in Cedar City or 
5 95 North Drive Light in Cedar City, Utah? 
6 MR. GOLDSWORTHY?: That, that was my previous 
7 business address and 94 North my ex-wife's home. 
8 THE JUDGE: Okay. The business address until 
9 when? 
10 MR. GOLDSWORTHY?: Until May of 2005. 
11 THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. 
12 MR. HANSEN: And then on the issue of attorney's 
13 fees otherwise defendant has meritorious factual disputes. 
14 He claims he (short inaudible, no mic) exercise undue 
15 influence, there was no problem there and that a, you know, 
16 he has factual disputes. 
17 As far as the attorney's fees like Your Honor has 
18 stated, the majority of the stuff that they've already done 
19 work can be used in the litigation, a, and so we shouldn't be 
20 required to pay attorney's fees for something they can just 
21 reuse. Thank you. 
22 ARGUMENT BY MR. HEIDEMAN 
23 MR. HEIDEMAN: May it please the court. 
24 Your Honor, this is just another attempt by the 
25 defendant in this case to try and benefit from delay. To 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 file an inappropriate reply on the basis that he was 
2 contacted late in the game, that's just inappropriate. It 
3 should be stricken and those comments should be stricken from 
4 the record because we've had no notice of those, we've not 
5 even received a copy OF the reply, and it's not appropriate 
6 to raise those at that point. 
7 But in dealing with the merits of the case there is 
8 simply no way that the defendant concede to have this 
9 removed. The Hernandez, Black's Title and Sierra case as 
10 well as Warren versus Dixon Ranch make it very clear that 
11 counsel, or that the defendant must be able to show why his 
12 excuse would prevent M m for communicating. He has to be 
13 able to relate to this court why it is that a divorce would 
14 prevent him from picking up the telephone, from leaving a 
15 forwarding address with the court, or from corresponding with 
16 his counsel. 
17 And we know very well, Your Honor, that Mr. Jensen 
18 attempted to contact the defendant on multiple occasions. 
19 And in fact on June 13th of 2005 we have a record of that 
20 contact before the court. A deposition was noticed, it was 
21 conducted. At that time Mr. Jensen tried to call his 
22 client's work. His client's work informed him that he was 
23 employed by them still and that he had departed for Colorado 
24 on business. So a representation to the court that he was 
25 no longer employed there as of May seems to be suspect. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 It's... I simply cannot see where the motion as pled meets 
2 the standard that is required. The specific language from 
3 the Black opinion I believe is what is relevant here. In 
4 the Black opinion--
5 THE JUDGE: Counsel, I want you to back up and 
6 address another problem that Ifm concerned about first. 
7 MR. HEIDEMAN: Certainly, Your Honor. 
8 THE JUDGE: How did you obtain service of your 
9 notice to appear or appoint? 
10 MR. HEIDEMAN: Service of the notice to appear or 
11 appoint counsel? 
12 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
13 MR. HEIDEMAN: I believe that the court issued 
14 that at the hearing that the defendant failed to appear at 
15 because the defendant had not given a forwarding address to 
16 the court. 
17 THE JUDGE: Well, how did you serve? Under 
18 Rule 74 how did you obtain service of the (inaudible word, 
19 voice trailed off). 
20 MR. HEIDEMAN: May I allow Ms. Naegle to speak to 
21 that. She was in charge of that. 
22 MS. NAEGLE: If I may I was actually involved in 
23 that. The, the initial a, withdrawal of counsel did not 
24 contain an address. And I contacted Mr. Jensen's office and 
25 asked for the addresses and notified them of the problem. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
2 MS. NAEGLE: They gave me the two addresses in 
3 regard to--
4 THE JUDGE: And you simply mailed it? 
5 MS. NAEGLE: Simply mailed it. 
6 THE JUDGE: And a, is it your position that that's 
7 adequate under the rules? 
8 MR. HEIDEMAN: I believe it is, Your Honor. It's 
9 his responsibility to maintain a forwarding address with the 
10 court. It's also his— 
11 THE JUDGE: Can you cite me to a rule that states 
12 that that's all the service that's required? 
13 MR. HEIDEMAN: I believe that at the point in time 
14 that he has a, an attorney who is given notice of the 
15 hearings and the attorney gives us the forwarding addresses, 
16 I think that, that is his responsibility. I don't have a 
17 rule off on the top of my head but I'm happy to research 
18 and provide a written memorandum to the court on that 
19 position. 
20 THE JUDGE: Well, I'm troubled by that. It would 
21 seem that in a circumstance like this where there hasn't been 
22 communication between the attorney and his client, we know 
23 that that's the context, the rule requires that before the 
24 court move forward notice to appoint or appear in person be 
25 given. The obvious intent of that rule is to warn the 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 client your attorney is not functioning for you, he's been 
2 allowed out of the case, you're now on your own, you need to 
3 appear by an attorney or by yourself. And simply mailing 
4 that to an address without return receipt requested, without 
5 other proof of service which would be required for a summons 
6 or complaint, or effecting personal service of the notice 
7 which was required under the old rule, a, I'm puzzled as to 
8 how that, that gives the court jurisdiction to go forward. 
9 MR. HEIDEMAN: Your Honor, I believe that this is 
10 a substantially different matter than a service of summons or 
11 a complaint. This is an individual--
12 THE JUDGE: • Sure, sure it is. But I'm— 
13 MR. HEIDEMAN: Well, I think that that's why it 
14 addresses the court's concern. It's, it's repugnant to me 
15 to believe that this individual by simply disappearing can 
16 evade litigation and cost my client money, and that's what 
17 he's attempted to do. If this court dismisses the default 
18 judgment they will effectively have awarded, or rewarded 
19 that. 
20 THE JUDGE: Well it may be, counsel. But it may 
21 be. But the address that you've used is the address who was 
22 provided to you by the attorney who says I haven't got 
23 contact with my client. How am I to have confidence that 
24 that notice got to Mr. Goldsworthy? 
25 MR. HEIDEMAN:: I think that that's, there's a, 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 that that, there's a difference of opinion there. He says I 
2 haven't had communication with my client as of the date of 
3 his motion to withdraw. But as of June 13th, Your Honor, he 
4 was making telephone calls to his client's work in my 
5 presence, in front of the presence of a stenographer, and 
6 that stenographer was being informed that he was in fact 
7 working for that company. You've just heard the defendant 
8 say he was not there after May but that's not true. We've 
9 got the, the stenographic record that he was on at least 
10 June 13th because they knew where he was at. 
11 And it's, it's... I mean, it seems to be a, a high 
12 burden to place on the plaintiff in this matter to say not 
13 only are you in charge of prosecuting your case but you're 
14 also in charge of making sure that the defendant doesn't run 
15 away from his responsibilities. 
16 THE JUDGE: Counsel, as of the 24th of August of 
17 2005 James Jensen in his affidavit said, 
18 Numerous correspondence and 
19 documentation was sent to the defendant 
20 and counter-plaintiff and returned moved, 
21 left no address, unable to forward, 
22 return to sender. I have attempted to 
23 send plaintiff has closed his business 
24 with no further contact information. Then he 
25 moves to withdraw. That's all 24th of 2005. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 September 20th of 2005, a document dated I think 
2 September 20th, it might be the 25th, must be the 20th, is 
3 when your notice to appear or appoint is filed and 
4 presumably mailed. Certificate of mailing says it was 
5 mailed that same day by U.S. Mail to the address, which by 
6 Mr. Jensen's address is no longer good. 
7 MR. HEIDEMAN: I understand, Your Honor. But at 
8 the same time there is a responsibility on the part of the 
9 defendant. He has a duty— 
10 THE JUDGE: Well why go through the motion of 
11 requiring the notice if we don't care if it was served? 
12 MR. HEIDEMAN: Well, Your Honor, we do care if it 
13 was served. We also care whether or not he's being 
14 attentive to his legal duties. 
15 THE JUDGE: Okay. I understand. 
16 Anything further further, counsel? 
17 FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. HANSEN 
18 MR. HANSEN: Well they could have... As far as 
19 the service of that notice to appear, I think it all ties 
20 back into whether he ought to be held responsible for a 
21 lapse, for neglect. And, a, they could have reached it, 
22 reached him by service of publication, they could have asked 
23 for certified mailing or some other alternate service. They 
24 mailed it knowing that, that he wasn't there or at least 
25 questioning— 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 THE JUDGE: Well it only gets you so far, 
2 counsel. ITm going to grant their motion to set aside the 
3 default judgment. I'm going to grant his, his request for 
4 attorney's fees. I presume I have an affidavit, 
5 Mr. Heideman. Is that correct? 
6 MR. HEIDEMAN: I haven't— 
7 THE JUDGE: Please submit one, I'll consider the 
8 attorney's fees. 
9 Mr. Goldsworthy, you have been less than diligent 
10 in maintaining contact with your attorneys and this court, 
11 it's going to cost you. 
12 I'll see, I'll receive the affidavit of attorney's 
13 fees and I'll determine the appropriate amount of attorney's 
14 fees to be awarded. 
15 Mr. Hansen, if you'll prepare an appropriate 
16 order. Thank you. 
17 MR. HEIDEMAN: Do you have time to set a 
18 scheduling conference, Your Honor? 
19 THE JUDGE: Excuse me? 
20 MR. HEIDEMAN: We probably don't have time for a 
21 scheduling--
22 THE JUDGE: We don't have time. We'll initiate 
23 telephone scheduling conference after I get the order. I 
24 encourage you to do a Rule 2 6 conference 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 030405431 
Judge: James R. Taylor 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through his attorneys of record and submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Reconsideration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On August 29, 2005, Defendant's prior counsel James Jensen filed a Motion for 
Permission to Withdraw as Counsel with an accompanying Affidavit setting forth the fact that Mr. 
Jensen had been unable to contact Mr. Goldsworthy for some time and that several items of mail had 
been returned to him as undeliverable. 
£f 
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2. On September 1, 2005, the Court granted Mr. Jensen's Motion for Permission to 
Withdraw as Counsel. 
3. Neither the Motion to Withdraw nor Order Granting Leave to Withdraw included the 
last known address of the Defendant. 
4. Plaintiffs counsel contacted Mr. Jensen's office to obtain the Defendant's last known 
addresses. 
5. On September 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint which was 
served on Defendant to his last known address via regular first class mail. 
6. On February 27, 2006, at a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside, the Court 
granted Defendant's Motion and held that the Court was setting aside the default because the Court 
did not believe that the Notice to Appear or Appoint was adequate since it was served via regular 
first class mail to Defendant's last known address and not by personal service or registered and/or 
certified mail. 
ARGUMENT 
A motion for reconsideration may be properly heard when it can be properly raised under 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. Kampros, 971 
P.2d 8, 11 (Ut App. Ct 1998). Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from an order for "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In this case, the Court reasoned that Defendant did not 
have proper notice to appear or appoint because it was known at the time of the withdrawal of 
Defendant's counsel that the addresses on record for Defendant were not current. The issue of 
proper notice was first raised by the Court at the hearing, and when asked regarding the service 
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requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint, Plaintiffs counsel suggested that he would and could 
provide a legal brief outlining the authorities that supported Plaintiffs counsel's position that the 
service made of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was sufficient. Plaintiffs counsel further argued 
that the requirement that Plaintiff was required to personally serve the Notice to Appear or Appoint 
was onerous and not required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the withdrawal of counsel and the 
sending of a Notice to Appear or Appoint. In particular Rule 74(a) states in relevant part that the 
notice of withdrawal shall include "the address of the attorney's client" and subsection (b) of the 
same rule provides that "the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on 
the unrepresented party." Of note, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that service upon a party of 
documents filed with the Court, unless otherwise specified by the Rules, "shall be made by 
delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address, or if no address is known, by 
leaving it with the clerk of the court." 
In Hawlev v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2005 WL 2099788 (Utah App. 2005), the Plaintiff 
sought relief from a Summary Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on the 
alternative arguments that he had failed to receive a notice to appear or appoint counsel and that he 
was never served with notice of the judgment. In affirming the trial court's decision to deny Mr. 
Hawley's motion for relief from the judgment, the Court held that: 
Hawley is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because he did notfulfdl his duty to inform 
the trial court and opposing counsel of any changes in his address nor did he exercise due 
diligence in keeping himself informed of ongoing court proceedings. See Volostnykh v. 
Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per curiam)(recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of 
any address changes and to "keep themselves apprised of ongoing court 
proceedings")(emphasis added). Id. 
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The facts of this case are directly analogous to those in Hawley. In both cases, neither 
Hawley nor the Defendant made any attempt to inform the Court or opposing counsel of his new 
address. As in Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel received a defective notice of withdrawal which did not 
correctly identify the last known address of the Defendant. Nevertheless, as Union Pacific did in 
Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel attempted to mail Defendant a notice to appear or appoint counsel to the 
address where Defendant was served as well as his business address, but all attempts were 
unsuccessful. Nothing in Hawley or in Rule 74 suggests that Plaintiffs counsel had a duty above 
and beyond serving Defendant with a notice to appear or appoint by regular first class mail to his last 
known address. Indeed, Hawley specifically states that it is the Defendant's duty to keep himself 
current with ongoing proceedings and to update his address with the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its Order granting Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
and to deny Defendant's motion on the basis that Defendant "did not make reasonably diligent 
efforts to learn of the entry of the judgment, and is therefore not entitled to relief." IcL 
In the event that this Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that the Court certify this matter under Rule 54 for interlocutory appeal. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /& day of March, 2006. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 3 
FILED 
Fourth JuHicin >?*^1 Court 
of Utah County. Z&to o\ Utah 
^<3/^k >n &puty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Kenneth Davis, 
Plaintiff : Ruling 
vs. : Date: March 30,2006 
Dennis Goldworthy, : Case Number: 030405431 
Defendant : Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. The 
motion questions the Court's reasoning and analysis but does not present arguments that could 
not have been made in connection with the motion. The motion is denied. Because the 
questioned ruling set aside a default judgment to allow complete litigation of the case, this Court 
is not able to certify that there is no just reason for delay in bringing the question before the 
Court of Appeals. The Defendant may well have asserted a meritorious defense which should be 
considered. The Court therefore declines to certify the case for interim appeal under Rule 54, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 30*jiay-Q£] 
Judge/James Rl 
Fourth Judicial 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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Davis v, Goldworthy 030405431 Ruling 3/30/06 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Plaintiff: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Lorelei Naegle 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Counsel for the Defendant: 
Gregory G. Hansen 
947 South 500 East, Suite 200 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
•*2L Mailed this_y/ day of //ijLU-f-—, 2006, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Court Clerk /, 
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ADDENDUM 4 
M L t U 
fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
DENNIS GOLDSWORTHY ^ 1 |pp|f)(/? ^Deputy 
828 Myrtle Ave. 
Canon City, CO 81212 
719-371-0091 
January 16.2006 
Dear Judge Taylor, 
I am writing this letter in regard to a notice I received from my ex-wife stating there is to 
be a hearing on February 35 2006. I was not aware of the ongoing situation with case 
number 030405431 due to the fact that I no longer live in Utah and now live in Colorado. 
I am asking for a thirty day continuance so that I might acquire counsel and schedule time 
off from work so that I can attend the hearing. I would like to express my appreciation in 
advance for your consideration in this matter. 





GREGORY G. HANSEN, Bar No. 10057 
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C. 
947 South 500 East, Suite 200 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 763-0155 
Facsimile: (801) 763-8379 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 







MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT 
CaseNo.030405431 
COMES NOW, Defendant Dennis Goldsworthy, by and through counsel, Gregory G. 
Hansen, and respectfully moves this court, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to set a side the default entered against him on November 7, 2005. Pursuant to Rule 
60(b), a default may be set aside for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and 
. . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Further, where any 
reasonable excuse is offered by a defaulting party, court's generally tend to favor granting relief 
from a default judgment, unless it appears that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the 
adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co, V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 
(Utah 1975). 
In this case, as contained in the Affidavit of Dennis Goldsworthy, filed herewith, there 
1 
are grounds for setting aside the default for mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. 
Defendant was going through a divorce at the time this litigation began, and was required to shut 
down his business, and move the Colorado. His only stable address was that of his business. 
When he moved, he had no forwarding address. He had not been able to communicate with his 
former counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of 2005, and moved the first week of June, 2005, which 
was when the Subpoena Duces Tecum was served on his counsel. Defendant's counsel did not 
inform him of the Subpoena or the deposition, and then withdrew in September of 2005 without 
informing him of the status of the case. 
Mr. Goldsworthy also states that the difficulties in his life at the time were so distracting 
and consuming that he neglected to pay attention to the lawsuit. Further, he did not receive the 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel because it was not mailed to him. However, Defendant is 
in a position now where he is able to pursue and properly handle this litigation. Further, in his 
affidavit, Defendant states that the claims made by the Plaintiff in this case are false. Moreover, 
setting aside the default in this case would not result in substantial injustice to the Plaintiff. He 
would only be required to pursue this case on the merits, and will lose nothing if his claims are 
meritorious. 
Therefore, the court should set aside the default for reasons of mistake, inadvertence, and 
excusable neglect, and allow this case to be heard on the merits. 
DATED: February / ^ , 2006. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify than on February g ,^ , 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE to be 
served upon the following by mailing it by first class mail to: 
Justin Heideman 
Lorelei Naegle 
ASCIONE HEIDEMAN & MCKAY LLC 
2696 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 180 





IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-00O00 
L. Earl Hawley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., a 
Delaware corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040461-CA 
F I L E D 
[September 1, 2005) 
2 005 UT App 368 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department, 000500737 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Attorneys: Richard Ranney, St. George, for Appellant 
Kent W. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and McHugh. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
L. Earl Hawley appeals the district court's denial of his 
Motion for Relief from Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(6). We affirm. 
Hawley first argues that pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial 
Administration 4-506, -an attorney does not need the approval of 
the trial court to withdraw as counsel once a motion for summary 
judgment has been briefed, argued, and orally decided from the 
bench, but before the judge has issued a written final order, 
therefore the district court erred when it did not grant Hawley 
relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(6). 
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-506 states in part 
that "an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only upon 
approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court 
has not issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed." Utah R. Jud. Admin. 
4-506(l).1 In the instant case, a final judgment was not entered 
until the trial court judge signed the order granting Union 
Pacific Railroad Company's (Union Pacific) Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 20, 2003. Therefore, Hawley's trial attorney, 
Mr. Mueller, improperly withdrew as counsel because he was not 
entitled to withdraw before August 20, 2003 without seeking the 
trial court's approval. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) ("A judgment 
is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes . . . 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above provided."); 
see, e.g., Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653, 655 
n.8 (Utah 1994) ("It is well settled that an unsigned minute 
entry does not constitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a final 
judgment for purposes of [appeal]," and noting that the 
"plaintiffs' motion was premature because [the trial court 
judge's] ruling had not been reduced to a written judgment." 
(quotations and citations omitted)).2 
Hawley also argues that he is entitled to relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b)(6) because Union Pacific did not serve 
Hawley with Notice of Judgment as required by rule 58A(d). Rule 
58A(d) states that ,f [a] copy of the signed judgment shall be 
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided 
in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not 
affected by the requirement of this provision." Utah R. Civ. P 
58A(d). We disagree with Hawley and hold that the trial court 
properly denied relief under rule 60(b)(6). 
Hawley is not entitled to relief under rule 60 (b) because he 
did not fulfill his duty to inform the trial court and opposing 
counsel of any changes in his address nor did he exercise due 
diligence in keeping himself informed of ongoing court 
proceedings. See Volostnykh v. Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per 
curiam) (recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of 
any address changes and to "keep themselves apprized of ongoing 
court proceedings"). Here, Hawley did not inform the trial court 
or opposing counsel of his new address. Union Pacific received 
xRule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was 
in effect at all relevant times in this case; however, the rule 
was repealed effective November 1, 2003 and has been recodified 
as Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 74. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74. 
2Hawley argues that he should have received a Notice to 
Appear or Appoint Counsel from Union Pacific pursuant to rule 4-
506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration because his 
attorney withdrew. However, rule 4-506(4) does not apply because 
Mueller did not properly withdraw as counsel. Therefore, Union 
Pacific was not obligated to serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel on Hawley. 
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Mueller's notice of withdrawal but the new address was not listed 
in the notice, rather it was found in the mailing certificate. 
As a result, Union Pacific attempted to mail Hawley a notice to 
appear or appoint counsel to the address provided in the 
Complaint twice, but both attempts were unsuccessful. In 
addition, Hawley failed to keep himself current with ongoing 
proceedings. Hawley called the court clerk in June, July, and 
August to determine if a final order regarding Union Pacific's 
Motion for Summary Judgment had been issued. He was advised that 
the judgment could be entered at any time, but Hawley did not 
call the trial court again for four months--until December. 
Hawley did not make reasonably diligent efforts to learn of the 
entry of the judgment, and is therefore not entitled to relief. 
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Hawley's rule 
60(b)(6) motion and, accordingly, we affirm. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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ADDENDUM 7 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00-
Sierra Wholesale Supply, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Radiant Technologies, Inc., a 
Florida corporation doing 
business in Utah, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20041021-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 15, 2005] 
2005 UT App 540 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030928544 
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn 
Attorneys: Barnard N. Madsen and Trent M. Sutton, Provo, for 
Appellant 
John A. Snow and Cassie J. Medura, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Radiant Technologies, Inc. appeals the trial 
court's denial of its motion, made pursuant to rule 60(b)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), 
to set aside a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff Sierra 
Wholesale Supply, L.L.C. We affirm. 
"We grant broad discretion to [a] trial court's rule 60(b) 
rulings because most are equitable in nature, saturated with 
facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of 
fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review.' 
Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92,^7, 104 P.3d 1198. "It is true that 
the law disfavors default judgments . . . . Nonetheless, the 
[trial court] has 'considerable discretion under [r]ule 60(b) in 
granting or denying a motion to set aside a [default] judgment1 
and for this court to interfere, 'abuse of that discretion 
must be clearly shown.'" Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. 
Pep' t, 1999 UT App 330,115, 991 P. 2d 607 (fourth alteration in 
original) (quoting Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986)). 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by concluding that Defendant failed to demonstrate excusable 
neglect in its motion to set aside the default judgment. "To be 
relieved from the default, [Defendant] must show that [its] 
motion to set aside was timely, that [it] has a meritorious 
defense, and that the default occurred for a reason specified in 
[r]ule 60(b)."1 Id. at %6. Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant 
part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect . . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). "To demonstrate that the default was due 
to excusable neglect, '[t]he movant must show that he has used 
due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by 
circumstances over which he had no control.'" Black's Title, 
1999 UT App 330 at [^10 (alteration in original) (quoting Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 
(1973) (emphasis omitted)). 
The thrust of Defendant's argument is that its neglect in 
contesting Plaintiff's complaint was excusable because its 
president, John Winning, was out of his office convalescing from 
back surgery at the time Plaintiff's requests to enter default 
judgment were received and Mr. Winning did not return to the 
office until after default judgment had been entered. However, 
"'[i]llness alone is not sufficient to make neglect in defending 
one's action excusable.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
xThere is also a dispute regarding the timeliness of 
Defendant's rule 60(b)(1) motion. However, because we conclude 
that Defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect, we need 
not consider this issue. See Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State 
Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330,16, 991 P.2d 607 (requiring the 
movant to show that the "motion to set aside was timely, that 
[it] has a meritorious defense, and that the default occurred for 
a reason specified in rule 60(b)." (emphasis added)). 
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Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743 
(1953)) . "A movant seeking relief may not simply rest on the 
assertion that he was ill to excuse his inaction; he must show 
that the nature of the illness incapacitated him such that he was 
unable to act." Id. 
Defendant has made no such showing in this case. Although 
Defendant avers that its president was out of the office 
recovering from back surgery, no affidavit was submitted to the 
trial court detailing how this so incapacitated Defendant, a 
corporation doing business on a national scale, that it was 
unable to take steps to protect its rights. See Warren, 260 P.2d 
741, 743 (finding that excusable neglect was not demonstrated by 
an affidavit that did not "identify the nature of the illness" or 
demonstrate how the director and trustee of the defendant 
corporation "was so incapacitated that he could not have called 
an attorney to have his rights and the rights of the corporation 
protected."). We agree with the trial court's observation that 
it seems unlikely that the president of such a corporation would 
be "out of the office for back surgery and no one is looking at 
his mail." Even if this were the case, however, it does not 
demonstrate that Defendant acted with the "due diligence" 
necessary to show excusable neglect. See Black's Title, 1999 UT 
App 33 0 at [^10 (quotations and citation omitted) . The trial 
court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment on these grounds. 
Moreover, although Defendant's registered agent, after being 
served, mistakenly forwarded Plaintiff's complaint and summons to 
the wrong law firm, Plaintiff sent copies of its requests for 
default directly to Mr. Winning. Thus, Defendant was on notice 
that Plaintiff sought default judgment against it, and that it 
needed to act to protect its rights.2 
In sum, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
denying Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. 
2Likewise, Defendant's neglect was not made excusable 
because the original default judgment mistakenly indicated that 
judgment was to be entered in favor of Defendant rather than 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's requests for default judgment, sent to 
Mr. Winning prior to the entry of the original default judgment, 
correctly indicated that Plaintiff sought default judgment 
against Defendant. 
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The facts and circumstances show that default resulted from 
Defendant's lack of due diligence rather than excusable neglect. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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